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Abstract  
The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has created a large number of 
capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity 
capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate 
governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors’ and regulators’ 
concerns about the corporate finance practice of China’s private sector firms, particularly 
regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively 
manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. 
We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other 
corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence 
consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation to P-chips’ 
questionable practice, and discuss its implications. 
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1. Introduction 
 Since embarking on a journey of market reforms in 1978, which took a big leap in the 
1990s, China’s economy has experienced an exponential growth, rising to the second largest 
economic entity in the world, with a GDP of $10.9 trillion in 2015 (World Bank 2017a). This 
market-oriented growth was initially fueled by the partial privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(Jiang and Kim 2015; Sun and Tong 2003; hereafter SOEs), but in recent years the economic 
power released by the phenomenal growth of the private sector has dominated the scene (Lu 
2015). The proportion of private enterprises in the economy expanded from less than 20 percent 
in 1996 to over 70 percent in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 1998; 2013). The 
internal growth of these companies soon arrives at a stage that an external source of capital is 
required for expansion. As these companies seek equity capital both domestically and 
internationally, the world sees an influx of applications for listings on its stock exchanges by 
China’s private sector companies. These listings spread across global exchanges from the US to 
London to Singapore, but mostly concentrate on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (hereafter 
HKSE), making Hong Kong the de facto hub for hosting initial public offerings (hereafter IPOs) 
of mainland Chinese private sector firms. 
Although these popular overseas listing destinations are believed to have high quality 
securities regulatory environment, there have been mounting concerns that overseas-listed 
private sector Chinese firms do not behave in a way predicted by the bonding hypothesis (Coffee 
2002; Stulz 1999), which stipulates that cross-listed firms bond to the better investor protection 
and more stringent listing, disclosure and corporate governance requirements of the foreign 
market, resulting in them resembling domestic firms of the listing location. Instead, numerous 
financial scandals associated with overseas Chinese firms broke in recent years, of which some 
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subject investors to significant financial losses.1 This paper seeks to examine the aggressive 
corporate reporting behavior of these foreign-listed mainland private sector firms using a large 
sample of companies listed on the HKSE, commonly known as P-chips, and propose an 
explanation for their questionable practice that is inconsistent with the bonding hypothesis.2  
Since their first listing in the turn of the 21st century, P-chips have grown substantially, at 
present representing the largest group of Chinese firms listed on the HKSE in terms of the 
number of companies, growing from 11 percent of the total in 2005 to nearly 31 percent in 2015. 
Assessing their importance based on size, P-chips now represent 20.3 percent of the total market 
capitalization of all companies listed on the HKSE as at the end of 2015. The increasing market 
share of P-chips in the Hong Kong market is at the expense of other non-mainland private sector 
companies, whose market capitalization is now less than 40 percent of the total, despite an 
increase in their number during the period. 
We first compare P-chip companies with their non-mainland private sector counterparts 
with respect to the level of accruals-based earnings management. We find that P-chips engage in 
significantly more earnings management than Hong Kong companies, as measured by 
discretionary accruals estimated using a modified Jones (1991) model (Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley 2005). This result is robust to using matched samples as well as using the probability of 
meeting or beating consensus forecasts by one cent as an alternative proxy for earnings 
management (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999). Further analyses show that P-chip firms 
                                                 
1 We provide a brief description of two cases of alleged corporate malfeasance committed by Hong-Kong-listed 
mainland private sector firms in Appendix A. 
2As detailed in Section 2, apart from P-chips, there are two more groups of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong: H-
shares and Red-chips, with Red-chip and the majority of H-share firms being controlled by the Chinese government. 
We choose to focus on comparing P-chips versus local Hong Kong firms because, in addition to different ownership 
structures potentially confounding our comparison (Chen and Yuan 2004; Leuz 2006), the fact that the Chinese 
government uses Hong Kong listings as a policy tool to reform inefficient SOEs, rather than Chinese SOEs self-
select to cross-list in Hong Kong, makes the bonding arguments less relevant for H-shares and Red-chips (Sun, Tong, 
and Wu 2013). 
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are also more likely to have engaged in other corporate misconduct such as misstating 
accounting statements and misappropriating corporate resources through tunneling. These results 
do not conform to the prediction of the bonding hypothesis.  
One possible explanation to this deviation is that Hong Kong has lower quality regulatory 
environment than mainland China in terms of capital market institutions. Evidence from a 
detailed comparison of the legal system and securities regulations between the two markets, 
however, does not support this explanation. Our analysis shows that Hong Kong is ahead of 
mainland China in areas such as investors protection, regulatory quality, listing rules, and 
corporate governance regulations, except for mainland China having marginally more extensive 
disclosure rules. More importantly, our survey of the literature and indices compiled by 
international organizations all indicate that the legal enforcement quality in Hong Kong is 
superior to that in mainland China. We also document that the average fines in enforcement 
actions is five times higher in Hong Kong than in China. Taken together, it is unlikely that the 
deviation from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis is due to Hong Kong having lower 
quality regulatory environment than mainland China. 
We propose cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a potential explanation to this 
phenomenon. P-chip companies may be more prone to corporate misconduct because Hong 
Kong securities regulators do not have extra-territorial investigation and enforcement jurisdiction 
in mainland China where P-chip companies are based, and investors may face difficulties to 
enforce their shareholder rights against P-chip companies and their directors due to 
complications arising from cross-border access to evidence, legal services, court assistance, or 
the incremental costs related to those services (HKSE 2013). Without the assistance and 
cooperation of relevant Chinese authorities, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
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(hereafter CSRC), provincial and local governments or courts, etc., it is difficult to seize the 
assets of these firms which are almost entirely located in mainland China, and without an 
extradition agreement in place between China and Hong Kong, the managers of these firms can 
“escape” enforcement actions by remaining in mainland China. Muddy Waters, an independent 
equity research and investment firm that soared to fame after uncovering frauds for a few US- 
and Canada-listed Chinese companies and bringing them down, suggested that the significant 
number of Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong could make it “the next bastion of fraudulent 
revelations” (Yousef 2012).  
Prior research shows that the institutional environment of a company’s home location is 
an important determinant of the likelihood of its cooperation with the firm’s listing location in 
the event of an enforcement action (Duarte, Kong, Siegel, and Young 2014). Hence, to test 
whether cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty is a plausible explanation to P-chips’ 
misbehavior, we identify the degree of legal and economic development of China’s 
cities/provinces in which P-chip companies are headquartered as a reverse proxy for enforcement 
difficulty. We find that the extent of earnings management is negatively associated with this 
enforcement difficulty proxy among P-chip firms, consistent with our prediction. In addition, we 
document that P-chips’ earnings response coefficient is significantly lower than that for Hong 
Kong firms by 0.21 percentage point in a two-day window surrounding earnings announcements, 
the magnitude of which is both statistically and economically significant. This evidence supports 
the view that investors are aware of regulators facing enforcement difficulty against P-chip 
companies, and they use stock prices as a mechanism to protect themselves against the 
heightened probability of expropriation by P-chip companies’ managers and controlling 
shareholders. 
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To further substantiate our enforcement difficulty explanation, we seek its external 
validity in two alternative cross-listing settings. First, we compare mainland-incorporated firms 
dual-listed in both mainland and Hong Kong to mainland-incorporated firms listed solely in 
Hong Kong. The difficulty to enforce Hong Kong regulations on dual-listed mainland 
corporations is lower because the CSRC has stronger incentives to cooperate with their Hong 
Kong counterpart under non-binding legal cooperation arrangements in place when corporate 
misconduct affects mainland investors. Consistent with the alleviation of cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement difficulty, we find dual-listed firms engaging in lower levels of earnings 
management. Second, recent reverse merger (hereafter RM) scandals in the US reveal a lack of 
cooperation between Chinese authorities/auditors and US authorities when the latter conduct 
investigations against listed companies originated in China (see, e.g., SEC 2015). This suggests 
that US regulators face similar enforcement difficulty issues as Hong Kong regulators. We 
compare Chinese private-sector firms listed in the US to domestic US firms, and find that indeed 
the former engage in a significantly higher level of earnings management than other firms.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature that 
examines the behavior of cross-listed firms relative to local firms in the listing location (e.g., 
Fung, Su, and Gul 2013; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 2006). These prior studies, however, often 
have a much smaller sample, and their cross-listed firms tend to differ from local firms in terms 
of listing rules (e.g., American depositary receipts vs. IPOs), disclosure requirement (e.g., 20-F 
vs. 10-K), and ownership structure (e.g., SOEs vs. private sector firms), which could confound 
their findings. Our P-chip setting allows us to test the research question using a much larger 
sample compared to prior studies in this stream, and more importantly, ensures that cross-listed 
firms and local firms are subject to the same listing and reporting requirements, and are similar 
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in terms of ownership structure.3 We provide much cleaner evidence that cross-listed firms are 
more aggressive in earnings management and other corporate malfeasances than local firms. In 
this regard, our paper echoes Sun, Tong, and Zhang (2013), who find that cross-listed firms can 
bring negative impacts to the cross-listing destination in terms of transaction cost for local firms 
and the overall price informativeness of the market.  
Second, our results contribute to its debate about the bonding hypothesis. A few 
explanations have emerged in the literature to explain findings that are inconsistent with its 
prediction. Licht (2001, 2003) argues that firms cross-list to access cheaper finance and greater 
visibility rather than to bond, and the experience in the US shows that they induce regulators to 
allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting regulations. Siegel (2005) posits that 
cross-listed firms bond themselves by building their reputation, but there is a lack of legal 
bonding with the US, a view shared by Lang et al. (2006). We underscore and provide evidence 
on cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible alternative explanation to cross-listed 
firms’ behavior that contradicts the predictions of the bonding hypothesis.  
Third, this paper relates to a series of recent studies that examine RM firms listed in the 
US. Chen, Cheng, Lin, Lin, and Xiao (2016) provide some evidence that the RM process allows 
Chinese firms that are poorly governed and have low bonding incentives to access the US capital 
market. We employ a more general setting, as P-chips obtain their Hong Kong listing via both 
IPOs and RMs, and provide complementary results.4 Our findings highlight that a listing in a 
strong legal and enforcement regime does not necessarily lead to high quality reported earnings, 
                                                 
3 Our much larger sample has a further advantage that we can match on multiple dimensions to ensure even closer 
comparability between cross-listed firms and local firms. 
4 Reverse mergers in Hong Kong are subject to bright line tests that may result in many reverse mergers being 
classified as new listing applications and are subject to similar scrutiny as initial public offerings. 
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and that it is important to examine the “underlying fundamentals” of a listing that may affect 
managerial incentives in opportunistic financial reporting. 
To our best knowledge, we are the first to directly examine P-chips’ earnings 
management. With private sector firms becoming a dominant economic power in mainland 
China, and the phenomenal growth of P-chips listed in Hong Kong, the quality of these firms’ 
financial decisions has become an important question for regulators, investors, and other 
stakeholders. Earnings, being a summary result of a firm’s operations during a period, are an 
important financial indicator upon which the market relies. Earnings manipulation distorts 
resource allocations and leads to unjustified wealth transfer from investors to managers. Our 
results thus have important implications for market participants in their investment decisions. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the institutional 
details of the Hong Kong stock market. Section 3 presents the research design while Section 4 
discusses the sample composition and main empirical results. Section 5 reports additional 
analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1 Regulatory environment in Hong Kong and mainland China 
Hong Kong has one of the largest stock markets in the world, despite its small 
geographical size with merely 7 million residents. The total domestic market capitalization of all 
HKSE-listed companies was $3,248 billion as of August 2016, comparable with that of the LSE 
Group and the Euronext (World Federation of Exchanges 2016).5 Listed companies in Hong 
                                                 
5 Hong Kong Stock Exchange was ranked the eighth globally. The first seven markets were: NYSE – US$19,009 
billion, NASDAQ – US$7,550 billion, Japan Exchange Group (includes Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Stock 
Exchange) – US$4,968 billion, Shanghai Stock Exchange – US$4,052 billion, LSE Group (includes London Stock 
8 
 
Kong are regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the HKSE, in addition 
to the company law of their places of incorporation. Being a former British colony, Hong Kong 
follows a common law legal tradition. This remains the case today as a result of the “one country, 
two systems” principle adopted by the Chinese government after the transfer of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong to China in 1997. Consequently, the securities regulations and their enforcement in 
Hong Kong and mainland China differ significantly. To quantify these differences, we survey 
indices widely used in the “Law and Finance” literature, alongside our own analysis of the 
regulations and practices in place to compare these two markets. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the analysis.  
(Insert Table 1) 
With a common English law origin, Hong Kong has a stronger legal system concerning 
shareholder and debtholder protection, relative to mainland China (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005). 
For instance, according to the revised version of the anti-director rights index (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), commonly used to measure the extent of shareholder 
protection in the legal system, Hong Kong scores 5, the highest among all rated jurisdictions, 
while mainland China scores 1. With regard to debtholder protection, Hong Kong is again rated 
one of the highest among all jurisdictions on the creditor rights index, scoring 4 vs. China’s 2 (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Allen et al. 2005). In terms of anti-self-
dealing, that is, the legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by insiders 
(Djankov et al. 2008), Hong Kong has the second highest score of 0.96, with mainland China 
trailing behind at 0.78. Finally on the overall regulatory quality, the regulatory quality index 
published by World Bank (2017b) gives Hong Kong a score of 1.85 vs. China’s -0.13 in 2005. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Exchange and Borsa Italia) – US$3,613 billion, Euronext (includes Belgium, England, France, Netherlands, and 
Portugal) – US$3,425 billion, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange – US$3,310 billion. 
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These comparisons suggest that Hong Kong has a stronger legal system for investor protection 
than mainland China.  
Beyond the legal system, we also compare the listing rules, corporate governance 
regulations, and disclosure requirements in these two markets. Acknowledging that the listing 
rules in mainland China do not offer the same level of investor protection as those in Hong Kong, 
the HKSE amended its listing rules, particularly by introducing Chapter 19A and Appendix 13 
Part D, to impose additional requirements for mainland China-incorporated companies seeking 
listings in Hong Kong. The CSRC correspondingly introduced the Mandatory Provisions for 
Companies Listing Overseas in 1994 to harmonize these requirements in mainland China on 
relevant companies. However, these additional requirements do not apply to P-chip companies 
because they are incorporated outside mainland China. 
With regard to corporate governance, concentrated ownership is prevalent in both 
jurisdictions: majority of firms listed in Hong Kong and China are either state-controlled or 
family owned (Fan and Wong 2002; Sun, Tong, and Tong 2002). Concerning the structure of the 
board, one of the most important aspects in corporate governance, both markets require 
independent directors to comprise a minimum of one-third of all directors, and their term to be 
fixed at three years with a possibility of serving consecutive terms. The requirements for the 
composition of the nomination committees and remuneration committees are also very similar, 
but there are minor differences in the composition of the audit committees. Further, in terms of 
executive compensation, pay-for-performance is more common in Hong Kong, mainly driven by 
the rarity of stock-based compensation in China. On an overall scale, the CLSA (2010) 
Corporate Governance Rating puts Hong Kong ahead of mainland China. 
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Different from corporate governance regulations, the disclosure requirements in Hong 
Kong may be less extensive than those in mainland China. For instance, the extent of disclosure 
index compiled by the World Bank (2017a) has consistently rated China at 10 (the highest 
possible score) since 2005, and Hong Kong at 9 between 2005 and 2013. Our own reading of the 
rules suggests that the main difference between the two sets of requirements arises from the 
vetting of corporate disclosures. The HKSE pre-vets announcements and circulars only for 
significant transactions (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), and did not ordinarily post-vet 
announcements until 2009 when the post-vetting of notifiable transactions and connected 
transactions was introduced (HKSE 2014). On the contrary, disclosures are subject to routine 
pre-vetting and post-vetting in mainland China (Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
2008). With respect to financial reporting, while the accounting standards in mainland China 
have converged with the Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (Hong Kong Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 2007), the CSRC imposes additional regulations on the form and 
content of periodic financial reports that listed companies in China must adopt (Hong Kong 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries 2008).  
Enacting stringent rules and regulations is only the first step to establishing a strong legal 
system. Equally important, if not more, is their enforcement (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
2013; Licht 2005). Hong Kong has in general a better enforcement environment than mainland 
China according to the enforcement indices we have surveyed. For instance, the rule of law 
index compiled by World Bank (2017b) gives Hong Kong a score of 1.61 vs. China’s -0.49 in 
2005. In terms of enforcement of financial reporting regulations, Hong Kong’s score of 22 on 
Brown, Preiato, and Tarca’s (2014) accounting enforcement index (out of 24) compares 
favorably with mainland China’s 16. These indices strongly indicate the superior enforcement 
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quality in Hong Kong relative to mainland China. Taking a step further, we compare the 
monetary penalties for violating securities rules and regulations. Using the information provided 
in official enforcement action press releases, we find that in 2011 (the end of our sample period), 
the average fines imposed by Hong Kong regulators was HK$1,271,403 (= US$164,052), almost 
4.5 times the average fines imposed by Chinese regulators (CNY239,173 or US$37,015).6 The 
relative low figure in China is primarily a consequence of the Chinese Securities Law capping 
the fines that can be imposed by the CSRC at CNY600,000 on legal persons and CNY300,000 
on natural persons in a majority of legal proceedings.  
2.2 Mainland Chinese firms on HKSE  
The Hong Kong stock market is characterized by a large number of companies originated 
in mainland China (Chow 2003). The first China-incorporated listing was approved in 1993 
when China started to reform and partially privatize its SOEs (Sun, Tong, and Wu 2013), but it 
was not until the turn of the millennium when we witnessed an influx of listings of mainland 
Chinese entities from the private sector.  
Firms originated from mainland China can list in Hong Kong via two different channels. 
First, they can incorporate under Chinese Corporate Law and, upon obtaining the CSRC 
approval, apply to list directly on the HKSE. These companies are nicknamed H-shares in the 
market. Alternatively, they can set up off-shore companies, often located in Hong Kong, 
Bermuda or Cayman Islands, and inject the parent companies’ assets into these companies which 
subsequently list in Hong Kong. These listed entities are referred to as Red-chips if they are 
controlled by the Chinese state, or P-chips if the parent companies are originated from the 
                                                 
6  See http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/index.htm?channel=3300/3313 for CSRC enforcement actions, and 
http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/enforcement-news/ for Hong 
Kong SFC enforcement actions. 
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Chinese private sector.7 Since their first listing in 2000, P-chips have become the fastest growing 
market segment on the HKSE. As shown in Table 2, which is compiled based on the information 
provided in the HKSE Monthly Market Highlights and HKSE China Dimension,8 there are 577 
P-chip firms listed on the HKSE (including both the main board and Growth Enterprise Market) 
as of December 2015, a total larger than H-shares and Red-chips combined. From 2005 to 2015, 
the number of P-chips increased by more than 4.5 times from 126 to 577, while H-shares from 
120 to 229, and Red-chips from 89 to 145. In addition, as shown in Panel B, the total market 
capitalization of P-chips has increased substantially in recent years, and is now on par with the 
market capitalization of either Red-chips or H-shares. 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
3. Research design 
We use discretionary accruals as our primary proxy for earnings management, which is 
common in the literature in settings such as equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998a, 
1998b), corporate valuation (Marciukaityte and Varma 2008), ownership structure (Guthrie and 
Sokolowsky 2010), and earnings management of Chinese firms (Giannetti, Liao, and Yu 2015; 
Gul, Cheng, and Leung 2011). To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the Jones (1991) model, 
modified by further controlling for the impact of firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005). In 
particular, following Giannetti et al. (2015) and others, we estimate the following model: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑆 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1
1
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝐴
+ 𝜆2∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝜆3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺 + 𝜆4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           (1)  
                                                 
7 The HKSE officially classifies a firm as a Red-chip company if (1) it has a minimum of 30% shareholding 
controlled by Chinese SOEs or provincial/municipal authorities, or (2) for firms with a Chinese state-related 
shareholding between 20% and 30% and there is a strong influence by these shareholding on the company’s board 
of directors. P-chips are officially known as Non-H Share Mainland Private Enterprises.  
8 https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statistics.htm.  
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where ACCURALS is net income minus operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets; TA is 
total assets; REVREC is the change is sales adjusted for receivables scaled by lagged total 
assets; PPEG is gross value of property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; ROA 
is net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
Following prior literature, we estimate Equation (1) separately for each pair of year and 
industry with more than ten observations, and obtain the absolute value of the residuals that 
forms our main metric of earnings management (ABSJONES). We define industry using the 
Fama-French 12 industry classification. We then pool all firm-year observations and regress 
ABSJONES on the dummy variable of interest, PCHIP, which equals one if an observation is a 
P-chip, and zero otherwise, and a set of control variables (subscripts omitted) as follows: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐽𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑆
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛼4𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛼6𝑂𝐶𝐹 + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛼9𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸
+ 𝛼10𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃 + 𝛼11𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛼12𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + Year fixed effects
+ Industry fixed effects + error 
(2) 
A positive (negative) α1 coefficient denotes that P-chips engage in more (less) earnings 
management through accounting accruals relative to non-P-chip firms. 
 We control for firm size (SIZE), growth (MTB and SALESGROWTH), and operating 
performance (ROA and OCF), as prior studies show that these firm characteristics are correlated 
with earnings management (Subramanyam 1996, among others). We also control for financial 
leverage (LEVERAGE), since there is evidence that managers use earnings management to avoid 
violating debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Prior research shows that firms 
engage in aggressive earnings management when seeking external financing in equity or debt 
(Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b; Liu, Ning, and Davidson III 2010), hence we include equity issuance 
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(EQUITYISSUE) and debt issuance (DEBTISSUE). We include the percentage of closely-held 
shares (OWNERSHIP) because past research shows that managerial and institutional 
shareholdings are negatively associated with earnings management (Chung, Firth, and Kim. 
2002). Finally, we control for the intensity of analyst monitoring (COVERAGE) and audit quality 
(BIG4), since monitoring by financial analysts and auditors could limit earnings management 
behavior (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Yu 2008). Detailed definition of 
all variables is outlined in Appendix B. 
  
4. Evidence on P-chips’ aggressive earnings management 
4.1 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 We devise the following algorithm to construct our P-chip sample, since the HKSE does 
not reveal their classification of P-chip companies to the public. First, we classify all firms 
headquartered in mainland China but not classified as H-shares or Red-chips by the HKSE as P-
chips, as these firms have their principal business location in mainland China. Second, for the 
rest of the firms that are headquartered in Hong Kong or other locations, we impose two criteria 
to screen P-chips: the ultimate controlling shareholders are mainland China individuals, and the 
majority of their assets are located and revenues originated in mainland China.9 We perform this 
screening by manually searching relevant information in IPO prospectuses (such as details about 
controlling shareholders), shareholding disclosures obtained from HKExnews, EDGAR’s Hong 
Kong equivalent maintained by the HKSE for the public dissemination of regulatory information 
about listed companies, and geographical segment information from Capital IQ. 
 
                                                 
9 We follow the MSCI to use 60% assets and 80% revenue as the thresholds in this paper.  
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Our sample consists of P-chip and local Hong Kong firms listed on the main board of the 
HKSE from 2005 to 2011. We begin with 2005 to hold constant the accounting standards 
because of the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Hong Kong 
in 2005. The complete list of all active and inactive firms as well as information about their 
country of incorporation, listing date, and name changes are obtained directly from the official 
HKSE Fact Books. 10  We collect accounting and financial data from Thomson ONE, 
supplemented by Capital IQ. We drop all firm-year observations that are banks and financial 
institutions (SIC codes starting with six), as well as firms that dual-list in other countries, HKSE-
defined foreign firms, and firms incorporated in countries other than Hong Kong, Bermuda, and 
Cayman Islands.  
 Panel A of Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for our sample. Approximately 
one third of our sample observations are P-chip companies (1,564 / (1,564+3,237) = 32.6 
percent), consistent with their significant presence in Hong Kong. P-chip companies have higher 
total assets (the median is $270.3 million vs. $176.0 million) and net income (the median is 
$13.5 million vs. $7.0 million) than non-P-chip companies, which makes them more profitable 
(the median of return on assets is 6.2% vs. 4.7%). They also have higher market-to-book ratios 
and sales growth (the medians are 1.5 vs. 0.9, and 23.0% vs. 8.6%, respectively). P-chip firms 
are less leveraged (the median is 15.2% vs. 22.7%), and over 67.2 percent of the observations are 
audited by a Big 4 auditor (71.6 percent for non-P-chip observations). The descriptive statistics 
also indicate that P-chip companies have a higher level of discretionary accruals relative to non-
P-chip companies, and the differences (the mean is 0.09 vs. 0.08, and the median is 0.07 vs. 0.05) 
are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
(Insert Table 3) 
                                                 
10 https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statrpt/factbook/factbook.htm. 
16 
 
 Panel B shows that the industry distribution between P-chips and non-P-chips is very 
similar, except for a slightly higher proportion of P-chip firms in capital intensive industries such 
as business equipment (16.4% vs. non-P-chips’ 11.7%), energy (5.4% vs. non-P-chips’ 1.4%), 
and manufacturing (14.2% vs. non-P-chips’ 11.2%), and a higher proportion of non-P-chip firms 
in shops (18.3% vs. non-P-chips’ 13.5%). 
4.2 Comparison of earnings management levels between P-chip and non-P-chip firms 
 Table 4 presents our main evidence on P-chips’ earnings management relative to other 
private sector firms listed in Hong Kong. In column (1), we include only PCHIP, our variable of 
interest, with industry and year fixed effects, while in column (2) we add financial characteristics 
of sample firms. Column (3) presents the results with all control variables included. The 
coefficient on PCHIP is consistently positive and highly significant, indicating that P-chip firms 
have a substantially higher level of discretionary accruals in absolute value relative to domestic 
firms, even after controlling for other determinants. The magnitude of the difference is also 
economically large. Taking the coefficient on PCHIP (= 0.0105) in column (3) as an example, 
given the average total assets of the sample amounted to $1,004.7 million, this translates to P-
chip companies reporting around $10.5 million more in profit (0.0105 × $1,004.7 million) 
contributed by discretionary accruals than non-P-chip companies, representing over 22% of the 
average net income of the P-chip sub-sample (= $46.6 million). Overall, our results provide 
both statistically and economically significant evidence on P-chips’ aggressive earnings 
management practice relative to non-P-chip firms.11 
(Insert Table 4) 
 Concerning the control variables, larger firms are less prone to manipulating accruals, as 
indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient on SIZE. Consistent with prior literature, high-
                                                 
11 Our results are robust to using the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995).  
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growth companies, proxied by MTB and SALESGROWTH, are more likely to manage earnings. 
The coefficient on OCF is negative, owing to the nature of accruals-based accounting system. 
We also find that firms raising capital, through either issuing equity (EQUITYISSUE) or debt 
(DEBTISSUE), have a higher level of discretionary accruals, consistent with the extant literature. 
Finally, we find that lenders play a significant monitoring role but not analysts, as suggested by 
the negative (positive) coefficient on LEVERAGE (COVERAGE). Overall, most of control 
variables behave in a way consistent with prior literature and economic intuition.   
4.3 Robustness analysis based on matched samples 
 Our main analyses in Table 4 employ samples that consist of all available firm-year 
observations that qualify for the classification of P-chips and non-P-chips based on a set of 
criteria. A valid concern is that different characteristics of P-chip vs. non-P-chip sub-samples 
could drive our results thus far. For example, Panel A of Table 3 reveals that a median P-chip 
firm tends to be larger, more profitable, and growing faster than a median non-P-chip firm. To 
address this issue, we first match P-chip with non-P-chip observations by industry and fiscal year. 
Next, we introduce size (SIZE) followed by growth (SALEGROWTH) to the matching criteria 
because prior literature underscores their importance in shaping firm-level accruals (Collins, 
Pungaliya, and Vijh 2017).12 We then re-estimate Equation (2) using these matched samples and 
report the results in Table 5, in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. The resulting sample size 
decrease gradually, but the coefficients on PCHIP are consistently positive and significant, and 
most importantly the results remain similar to those reported in Table 4 based on the full sample. 
(Insert Table 5) 
4.4 Alternative measures of earnings manipulation  
                                                 
12 We have controlled for operating performance, another important determinant of discretionary accruals, in the 
estimation of ABSJONES following Kothari et al. (2005). Our inference remains unchanged if we further match on 
ROA.  
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Our main inferences rely on the validity of a modified Jones (1991) discretionary accruals 
model (i.e., ABSJONES). Despite the popularity of Jones-type models, they have some 
drawbacks, such as their sensitivity to business models (Owens, Wu, and Zimmerman 2017), and 
the industry-year cross-sectional estimation procedure significantly limiting the sample size 
(Ecker, Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2013). In this section, we first use an alternative earnings 
management proxy that is not based on accruals and thus circumvents the accruals estimation 
problem, and then propose other metrics that measure firms’ misbehavior to strengthen our 
argument.  
Our non-accruals-based proxy for earnings management is the probability of firms 
meeting or just beating analysts’ consensus forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999). A significant 
volume of past research shows that firms have incentives to manipulate earnings to meet or beat 
the analysts’ earnings forecasts by a small amount to avoid the negative stock market or 
executive compensation consequences of missing the market expectations (see, e.g., Jensen 2005 
for a discussion). We construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm-year 
meets or beats the last consensus analysts’ forecast before an earnings announcement by one cent, 
and zero otherwise. Our results, presented in column (1) of Table 6, indicate that P-chips are 40% 
more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts by one cent than non-P-chip firms.  
(Insert Table 6) 
Next, we focus on more serious corporate misdeeds other than earnings management: 
misstating financial statements and tunneling corporate resources. We first estimate the 
probability of material accounting misstatements using the prediction model developed by 
Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011).13 This model synthesizes financial statement variables 
                                                 
13 We follow Dechow et al. (2011) and use the following two steps to estimate the conditional probability of 
material misstatement. 
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that are useful for detecting material accounting misstatements and generates an F score, a higher 
value of which indicates higher misstatement likelihood. This measure has an advantage that it 
incorporates other measures beyond accruals to estimate the likelihood of earnings misstatements. 
We define HIGHFSCORE as a dummy variable that equals one for firm-years with above-
normal risk, and zero otherwise. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that P-chip firms have a 
substantially higher probability of materially misstating their financial statements, consistent 
with our prediction. Our second additional metric measures whether P-chips misappropriate 
company resources at the expense of minority shareholders through tunneling resources out of 
the companies to their controlling shareholders. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) show that, 
among companies listed in Hong Kong, the likelihood of undertaking connected party 
transactions that violate the HKSE’s listing rules are higher for firms with mainland Chinese 
ultimate owners. Their results, however, do not apply to P-chip companies because their sample 
period ends in 2000 before the influx of P-chip listings in Hong Kong. We follow prior literature 
and use other receivables scaled by total assets as a proxy for tunneling, given that controlling 
shareholders in China widely practice the use of intercorporate loans, typically reported as “other 
receivables,” to siphon funds out of publicly listed companies (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). The 
coefficient on PCHIP in column (3) is positive and significant, indicating that P-chips engage in 
tunneling of corporate resources to expropriate minority shareholders.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Step 1: Predicted Value = - 7.893 + 0.790 × RSST + 2.518 × CHREC + 1.191 × CHINV + 1.979 × SOFTASSETS + 
0.171 × CHCS – 0.932 × CHROA + 1.029 × ISSUE.   
Step 2: Conditional Probability = e(Predicted Value) / (1 + e(Predicted Value)).  
RSST represents balance sheet accruals calculated as per Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005); CHREC 
represents changes in account receivables; CHINV represents changes in inventory; SOFTASSETS represents the 
percentage of soft assets, measured as total assets minus fixed assets and cash; CHCS represents changes in cash 
sales; CHROA represents changes in return-on-assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that equals one for securities 
issuance, and zero otherwise. The F score is then calculated as the conditional probability scaled by the 
unconditional probability of material misstatements. We use the unconditional probability estimated by Dechow et 
al. (2011), which is 0.37%, and classify F score greater than one as above normal risk of misstatement. 
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 Taken together, we provide robust evidence that P-chip companies consistently engage in 
more corporate malfeasances than their counterparts listed in Hong Kong. This finding is 
opposite to the prediction of the bonding hypothesis. As we discussed in Section 2.1 about the 
institutional background, Hong Kong overall has a better regulatory environment than mainland 
China. Hence, the deviation from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis cannot be explained 
by the listing location having a less superior regulatory environment than the home location. In 
the next section, we conjecture, and present evidence on, cross-jurisdictional enforcement 
difficulty as an explanation to this deviation.  
 
5. Cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty  
5.1 The notion of enforcement difficulty 
The presence of enforcement difficulty has long been echoed in Hong Kong regulators’ 
narratives. For instance, Paul Chow, former Chief Executive of the HKSE, once highlighted that 
“Hong Kong and the Mainland have separate legal systems. Legal judgements in one system are 
not recognised or enforceable in the other system…… Overseas regulators may not necessarily 
have all the powers available to pursue corporate wrong-doing as the required infrastructure 
may still be developing” (Chow 2003). Martin Wheatley, the former Chief Executive Officer of 
the SFC in Hong Kong, once noted that “If it is a domestic company within the home jurisdiction, 
the regulator usually has a range of powers to deal with the company. Where it is outside your 
own jurisdiction you have to rely on the powers of the ‘home’ regulator” (Wheatley 2006). In 
2013, the HKSE formally published an investor education document highlighting cross-
jurisdictional enforcement difficulty arising from overseas firms.14 
                                                 
14 The document (HKSE 2013; available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/listsptop/listoc/rioi.htm) 
highlights that “[a]n overseas company is subject to a different set of corporate laws governing its affairs including 
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While legal cooperation between jurisdictions can ease the difficulties faced by regulators 
of the listing location when they seek to enforce law and regulations against foreign issuers 
(Duarte et al. 2014), Hong Kong securities regulators have repeatedly voiced concerns about 
mainland authorities rejecting their requests for information to investigate Hong Kong listed 
companies and businessmen from mainland China, their inability to have investigations 
conducted in China, no full reciprocity of regulatory and law enforcement assistance between the 
two jurisdictions, and no mutual transfer of fugitives (Lau 2006; Sun, Tong, and Zhang 2013; 
Wang and Yiu 2004). All these factors translate to lack of evidence with which to support 
prosecutions or enforcement actions in Hong Kong against P-chips from mainland China. In this 
regard, we argue that, even though Hong Kong has high regulatory standards for listed firms, in 
the presence of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty, managers of P-chip firms perceive 
lower risks in mis-behaving, and thus have stronger incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.  
5.2 Cross-sectional variation in enforcement difficulty 
If Hong Kong securities regulators need to investigate P-chips’ alleged irregularities or 
enforce the outcome of the investigations, such as seizing their assets or bringing their key 
managers to face justice, they will likely require the assistance of local authorities such as 
provincial governments and courts at the companies’ home location. Duarte et al. (2013) argue 
and find that the likelihood that a foreign firm’s home country cooperates with the authorities of 
the listing location in the event of an enforcement action depends on the home country’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
duration, organisation structure, governing bodies and their powers, shares transfer, shareholders rights, 
shareholders’ dispute resolutions. It may be difficult for shareholders of an overseas company to enforce their 
shareholder rights against the company or its directors due to complications arising from cross-border access to 
evidence, legal services, court assistance or the incremental costs related to those services. Hong Kong regulators 
may not have extra-territorial investigation and enforcement jurisdiction. Instead, reliance has to be placed on the 
overseas regulatory regimes to enforce against any corporate governance breaches committed by their subject. If an 
overseas company’s principal operations and assets are outside its place of incorporation or Hong Kong, they may 
be subject to other laws, standards, restrictions and risks that significantly differ from those in Hong Kong.”  
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institutions. There are significant regional variations amongst Chinese cities and provinces in 
terms of institutional environment (Chen, Wang, Li, Sun, and Tong 2015). We posit that if a P-
chip firm is headquartered in a city/province that is more economically and legally developed, 
the local authorities and regulators will be more willing to assist their Hong Kong counterparts in 
investigating securities and financial wrongdoings and the resulting enforcement actions. 
Following Chen et al. (2015), we use the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index of 
Marketization of China’s provinces compiled by Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011) to capture the legal 
and economic development of the cities/provinces in which P-chips are headquartered. The index 
is compiled based on the scores of each city/province on the following five dimensions: (1) the 
relationship between government and market, (2) the economic development of the private sector, 
(3) product market development, (4) factor market development, and (5) the development of 
market intermediaries and legal system.15 Taking 2009 as an example, the index values range 
from 0.38 (Tibet) to 11.80 (Zhejiang), with a higher value indicating a high level of 
marketization.  
We match each P-chip company to the marketization index by year and the city/province 
in which the company is headquartered. 16  If aggressive earnings management is indeed 
associated with the level of cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty, we expect a higher level 
of enforcement difficulty in less developed business environment. Since some companies are 
headquartered in Hong Kong, which is not included in the index, we assign the highest value of 
the index among all cities/provinces in that year to Hong Kong. We lose 11 observations due to 
unavailability of their headquarters location data. 
                                                 
15 Our results remain similar if, instead of using the composite index, we use only the score of the development of 
market intermediaries and legal system component. 
16 Since our index stops in 2009, we assume that the index values for 2010 and 2011 remain the same for all 
locations. 
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 We present our analysis in Table 7. First, we regress earnings management on the 
marketization index (MARKETIZATION) in column (1). The coefficient on MARKETIZATION is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that P-chip firms from cities/provinces with a 
stronger legal and economic environment engage less in earnings management, consistent with 
the prediction of the enforcement difficulty explanation. 17  We next separate P-chip firms 
headquartered in mainland China into three groups: the headquarters cities/provinces are of low 
(the lowest 25th percentile), medium (between the 25th and 75th percentile), or high (the highest 
25th percentile) legal and economic development. We re-run the analysis and the results in 
column (2) show that the extent of earnings management varies monotonically with the level of 
enforcement difficulty. Specifically, firms headquartered in provinces that are relatively less 
legally and economically developed have a significantly higher level of discretionary accruals 
than those headquartered in developed provinces. The difference of the coefficients (0.0232 -
0.0089 = 0.0143), which is statistically significant (p-value = 0.07), translates into $14 million (= 
0.0143 × $1,004.7 million) of net income, or 30% of the average net income of our P-chip 
subsample. In sum, providing our proxy for cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty is valid, 
which is a reasonable assumption given institutional environment facilitates inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation (Duarte et al. 2014), our results strongly support cross-jurisdictional enforcement 
difficulty as a factor behind P-chip firms’ aggressive earnings management behavior. 
(Insert Table 7) 
5.3 Market response to P-chip’s earnings announcement 
If both regulators and P-chip companies are aware of the problem of cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement difficulty, it is natural to expect that investors also know of the potential negative 
                                                 
17 We also use the geographical proximity between the headquarters location and Hong Kong to proxy for cross-
jurisdictional enforcement difficulty. Our results hold but are not reported for brevity. 
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consequences such as earnings management, and hence they may associate lower credibility to 
P-chip companies’ reported earnings. Following this argument, we examine whether the market 
places a lower weight on P-chip companies’ unexpected earnings during a window of earnings 
announcement by estimating the following equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝜃3𝑆𝑈𝐸 × 𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃 + 𝜃4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝜃5𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝜃6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
+ 𝜃7𝑆𝑈𝐸 × 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝜃8𝑆𝑈𝐸 × 𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝜃9𝑆𝑈𝐸 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + Year fixed effects
+ Industry fixed effects + error 
(3) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns in a specified short-window around the earnings 
announcement date, where abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the return of the 
Hang Seng Index.18 SUE is unexpected earnings deciles measured as the change in return on 
assets. We include firm size, market-to-book ratio, and an indicator of negative earnings as 
controls alongside year and industry fixed effects.  
 Table 8 presents the results with CAR measured in two different windows. In both 
windows, the coefficients on SUE, which measure the market reaction to non-P-chip firms’ 
earnings surprises, are positive and significant as expected. More importantly, the interaction 
term SUE×PCHIP reports a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that the market 
discounts P-chips’ earnings surprises. The magnitude of the discount is economically significant 
– more than 30 percent relative to non-P-chip companies’ earnings surprises depending on the 
return window. This result provides corroborative evidence that P-chip companies engage in 
earnings management activities against the benefits of minority shareholders, but the market 
anticipates their misbehavior. 
(Insert Table 8) 
5.4 Alternative cross-listing settings 
                                                 
18  The Hang Seng Index is a value-weighted stock market index in Hong Kong and the most widely quoted 
performance indicator of the Hong Kong stock market. 
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 To further substantiate cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as an explanation 
behind P-chips’ aggressive earnings management relative to local Hong Kong listed firms, we 
seek its external validity using alternative cross-listing settings.  
5.4.1 AH versus non-AH firms 
 Our first alternative setting explores firms incorporated in mainland China and listed on 
the HKSE, commonly known as H-shares. Like P-chips, H-share firms primarily operate in 
mainland China with most of their assets, controlling shareholders, and senior personnel located 
outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong regulators. Hence, we expect that Hong Kong regulators 
also face cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty against H-share firms. However, some H-
share firms are concurrently listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (hereafter AH 
firms), and thus are subject to the CSRC regulations in addition to regulations in Hong Kong. 
The CSRC and the SFC have started a formal cooperation arrangement from as early as 1993 
when the first Memorandum of Regulatory Cooperation was signed, and both regulators have 
been signatories to the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation 
and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions since 2007 and 2003 respectively. These arrangements, though not binding, have 
fostered legal and enforcement cooperation between the two jurisdictions, especially on firms 
that are listed in both markets, i.e., AH-firms, in which the interests of investors from mainland 
China are involved. Hence, Hong Kong regulators likely face less difficulty to enforce securities 
laws and regulations against AH firms, relative to H-shares listed solely in Hong Kong (hereafter 
non-AH firms). To the extent that cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty explains the 
aggressive earnings management of cross-listed firms, as we have posited in the case of P-chips, 
we expect that AH firms engage in less earnings management than non-AH firms.  
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 We obtain a list of H-shares from the HKSE Fact Book and a list of AH firms from 
Capital IQ. Column (1) of Table 9 reports the regression results based on a sample of H-shares 
from 2005 to 2011, using a specification similar to Equation (2) by replacing PCHIP with AH, 
the variable of interest, which takes the value of one for AH firms, and zero for non-AH firms. In 
column (1), we include the same set of control variables as in Table 4. The coefficient on AH is 
negative and significant, consistent with our expectation based on cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement difficulty.19 
5.4.2 US evidence  
If Hong Kong securities regulators and investors face cross-jurisdictional enforcement 
difficulty against mainland Chinese firms, securities regulators from other jurisdictions in which 
a significant number of mainland Chinese firms cross-list could face a similar problem. For 
example, in 2011 when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated Longtop 
Financial Technologies, a Cayman Island incorporated company from mainland China, the 
Chinese affiliate of Deloitte, a Big 4 auditor, refused to produce audit documents to cooperate 
with the SEC in its investigations, claiming that doing so would break Chinese law against 
sharing trade secrets (see SEC 2015 for more details about the difficulties encountered by the 
SEC in investigating private sector Chinese firms listed in the US). Prior research examining 
these issues mainly focuses on US-listed RM firms that have avoided the scrutiny during an IPO 
process (Chen et al. 2016; Siegel and Wang 2013; among others). We broaden the sample to 
include all private sector firms from mainland China that cross-list in the US, via RM or IPO, 
and repeat our analysis with the US sample using Equation (2). We use the Halter USX China 
Index to identify Chinese private sector firms listed in the US, and report the results in Column 
                                                 
19  H-shares consist of a large set of state-owned enterprises and a small number of private sector firms. We 
additionally control for a state ownership dummy, and the coefficient on AH remains negative and significant. 
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(2) of Table 9. The coefficient on USPCHIP, a dummy variable indicating these Chinese private 
sector firms, is positive and significant, which corroborates our main earnings management 
results and further substantiates enforcement difficulty behind cross-listed firms’ aggressive 
reporting behavior. 
(Insert Table 9) 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide some descriptive evidence that P-chip firms, the largest and 
most representative group of Chinese private sector firms listed overseas, manipulate their 
accounts and engage in corporate malfeasance. We further explore the role of cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement difficulty as a potential explanation to P-chips’ aggressive earnings management, 
and find multiple corroborative evidence supporting this conjecture.  
Even though Hong Kong has high quality regulatory standards than mainland China, 
investigating P-chips’ wrongdoing is difficult and challenging because P-chips largely operate in 
a regime that does not have a strong legal cooperation with Hong Kong (Wheatley 2006). 
Consequently, the difficulty faced by Hong Kong regulators to enforce securities law and 
regulations on P-chip firms results in a situation in which, instead of “bonding” P-chips with 
Hong Kong’s high quality regulations, the Hong Kong listing further intensifies the conflicts 
between P-chips’ controlling shareholders and minority investors, leading P-chips to behave in a 
way that deviates from the prediction of the bonding hypothesis.   
Our conclusion is subject to several caveats. While we believe that understanding how P-
chip firms behave in the international capital market arena is important, and that results 
concerning P-chip firms are interesting in their own right, we acknowledge that the P-chip 
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setting is special, if not unique, and therefore generalization of our results to other cross-listed 
firms should be exercised with caution. Moreover, while we argue that cross-jurisdictional 
enforcement difficulty is a contributing factor to what we find, we cannot draw a definite causal 
link from enforcement difficulty to P-chips’ aggressive earnings management, because we 
cannot observe the same P-chip firms without enforcement difficulty. Despite these caveats, we 
believe our findings are relevant to academics and regulators as well as investors who seek to 
invest and diversify their portfolios through the inclusion of China’s private sector firms. 
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APPENDIX A 
Two exemplary cases of corporate malfeasances committed by P-chip companies 
First Natural Foods Holdings Limited (HKSE Ticker: 1076) 
 First Natural Foods (“FNF”) was a Bermuda-incorporated food manufacturing and 
trading company listed in Hong Kong from February 11, 2002. The Company had three wholly-
owned subsidiaries in mainland China, Longyu, Dingwei, and Jia Jing, and was in full and 
exclusive control by its founder and Chairman Chunglung Yeung (alias Zhonglong Yang), his 
son and CEO Le Yang, and his son-in-law Chaopeng Ni.  
 In December 2008, Yeung dismissed all employees and instructed FNF’s trading 
suspension. Yang, Ni, and another executive director residing in mainland China tendered their 
resignation by facsimile copies. All of them could not be located and reached ever since. 
 FNF filed for bankruptcy soon after. The provisional liquidators’ investigation uncovered 
a few irregularities. First, the Company’s audited financial statements for 2007 showed a strong 
cash balance amounting to RMB725 million when it had only RMB20 million cash deposits. 
Second, Yeung withdrew HK$85 million from one of FNF’s bank accounts without informing 
the Board, and instructed the bank not to disclose any information about the Company’s account 
to the provisional liquidators. He subsequently closed the account in February 2009. 
 The provisional liquidators attempted to regain control of the subsidiaries taken over by 
the Yeung’s family via the courts in China. While the court ruled in favor of the Company, they 
did not enforce the rulings. The provisional liquidators sought help from the State Administration 
of Industry and Commerce in Fuqing, Fuzhou Intermediate People’s Court, the Higher People’s 
Court of Fujian Province, the Fujian Provincial Department of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Bureau, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Guangdong, and the 
Ministry of Commerce of China. All efforts failed in vain. 
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 In April 2009, the provisional liquidators found that the three main subsidiaries (Longyu, 
Jia Jing, and Dingwei) were either misappropriated by Yeung and his family or had no asset left. 
In April 2013, the SFC commenced legal proceedings in Hong Kong against Yeung over the 
alleged embezzlement of HK$84 million of corporate assets and false accounting. Yeung 
remained at large as of July 2015. 
Daqing Dairy Holdings Limited (HKSE Ticker: 1007) 
 Daqing Dairy, a milk powder company incorporated in Cayman Islands and 
headquartered in the Heilongjiang province, was listed in Hong Kong in October 2010.  
 In March 2012, Deloitte resigned as Daqing’s auditor and the Company was subsequently 
suspended for trading. Deloitte raised five main concerns about its audit of the Company’s 
financial statements: (1) fraudulent milk procurement transactions, (2) unexplained differences 
between sales receipt notes presented for audit work and for a Tax Bureau investigation, (3) 
management removal of accounting records, (4) the validity and commercial substance of the 
acquisitions of certain farm assets, and (5) difficulties encountered during visits to the branch of 
one of the Group’s banks. 
 Daqing commissioned an independent investigation. On January 2, 2013, the heating 
pipes of some offices in Daqing’s headquarters in Heilongjiang cracked, causing extensive 
damages to the computers and documents. Within days its CEO Yu Zhao tendered his 
resignation to Daqing’s Board via electronic means. In November 2013, Daqing announced the 
engagement of forensic accountants to investigate the potentially fraudulent transactions raised 
by Deloitte, but ten months later, Daqing announced no progress in the forensic investigation due 
to damages to key documents in the January 2013 accident, as well as lack of cooperation from 
former auditors and the previous and current management of the mainland China subsidiaries. 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable definition 
 
Variable Definition 
ABSJONES Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated based on performance-
adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) 
PCHIP An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a P-chip company, and 
zero otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets  
MTB Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at fiscal year end 
SALESGROWTH Percentage change in sales over two consecutive years 
ROA Net income scaled by one-year lagged total assets  
OCF Operating cash flow scaled by total assets 
LEVERAGE Total debt deflated by market value of equity at fiscal year end 
EQUITYISSUE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s common equity increases 
by more than 10% from last year, and zero otherwise 
DEBTISSUE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s total debt increases by 
more than 10% from last year, and zero otherwise 
OWNERSHIP Fraction of outstanding shares held by insiders, block holders (over 5%), 
other corporations not in a fiduciary capacity, and pension plans 
COVERAGE Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analyst following a firm at 
fiscal year end 
BIG4 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise 
HIGHFSCORE An indicator variable that equals one if the probability of material 
misstatement estimated using the F-score model (Dechow et al. 2011) is 
above normal risk, and zero otherwise 
MBE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm meets or beats consensus 
earnings forecasts by one cent 
TUNNELING Other receivables deflated by total assets 
CAR Cumulative abnormal returns over a specified window around the 
earnings announcement date, whereby abnormal return is defined as a 
firm’s return less the return of the Hang Seng Index 
SUE Deciles of unexpected earnings measured as the change in earnings scaled 
by total assets 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has negative net income, 
and zero otherwise 
USPCHIP An indicator that equals one if a US-listed firm is from the Chinese 
private sector, and zero otherwise 
AH An indicator that equals one if an H-share firm is dual-listed in mainland 
China, and zero otherwise 
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Variable Definition 
MARKETIZATION The National Economic Research Institute (NERI) index of 
Marketization of China’s provinces compiled by Fan et al. 
(2011) that tracks the legal and economic development of 
Chinese cities and provinces 
HIGH_MARKETIZATION An indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have 
the lowest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among P-
chip observations, and zero otherwise 
MEDIUM_MARKETIZATION An indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have 
an NERI index value between the 25th and 75th percentile 
among P-chip observations, and zero otherwise 
LOW_MARKETIZATION An indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have 
the highest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among 
P-chip observations, and zero otherwise 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of institutional environment 
 
This table summarizes the institutional environment of Hong Kong and mainland China. Revised anti-
director rights index is compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) and calculated by summing six indicator 
variables counting the existence of six legal rules (vote by mail, shares not deposited, cumulative voting, 
oppressed minority, pre-emptive rights, and capital to call a meeting) favorable to shareholders within a 
jurisdiction. Creditor rights index is compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) for Hong Kong and Allen et al. 
(2005) for China, calculated by summing four indicator variables counting the existence of four legal 
rules (no automatic stay on assets, secured creditors first paid, restriction for going into reorganization, 
management does not stay in reorganization) favorable to creditors within a jurisdiction. Anti-self-dealing 
index is compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) and calculated as the average of ex ante private control of self-
dealing (approval by disinterested shareholders, disclosure by buyer, disclosures by seller, and 
independent review) and ex post private control of self-dealing (disclosure in periodic filings, standing to 
sue; rescission, ease of holding the seller civilly liable, ease of holding the approving body civilly liable, 
access to evidence). Regulatory quality index is from World Bank (2017a) Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. CLSA corporate governance index is from CLSA (2010) CG Watch 2010 Report produced in 
collaboration with the Asian Corporate Governance Association. Disclosure index is from World Bank 
(2017b) World Development Indicators. Rule of law index is from World Bank (2017a) Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Accounting enforcement index is from Brown et al. (2014). Average fine imposed 
is calculated based on the fines disclosed in 2011 regulatory action press releases by the CSRC (China) or 
the SFC (Hong Kong).  
 
 Mainland China Hong Kong  
Revised anti-director rights index 1 5 
Creditor rights index 2 4 
Anti-self-dealing index 0.78 0.96 
World Bank regulatory quality index  -0.13 1.85 
CLSA corporate governance index  49 65 
World Bank disclosure index  10 9 
World Bank rule of law index  -0.49 1.61 
Accounting enforcement index 16 22 
Average fine imposed 
CNY 239,173 
(US$ 37,015) 
HK$ 1,271,403 
(US$ 164,052) 
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TABLE 2  
Companies listed on the HKSE by classification 
This table presents the number and percentage of companies listed on the HKSE by classification, as well 
as their absolute and relative market capitalization. Figures presented in this table are sourced from HKSE 
Monthly Market Highlights and HKSE China Dimension. 
 
Panel A: Number (Percentage) of companies listed on the HKSE by classification 
Year P chips H shares Red chips Rest of HKSE Total 
2005 126 (11.1%) 120 (10.6%)   89 (7.8%) 800 (70.5%) 1,135 
2006 136 (11.6%) 141 (12.0%)   90 (7.7%) 806 (68.7%) 1,173 
2007 200 (16.1%) 146 (11.8%)   93 (7.5%) 802 (64.6%) 1,241 
2008 222 (17.6%) 150 (11.9%)   93 (7.4%) 796 (63.1%) 1,261 
2009 271 (20.5%) 156 (11.8%)   97 (7.4%) 795 (60.3%) 1,319 
2010 327 (23.1%) 163 (11.5%) 102 (7.2%) 821 (58.1%) 1,413 
2011 365 (24.4%) 168 (11.2%) 107 (7.2%) 856 (57.2%) 1,496 
2012 437 (28.2%) 176 (11.4%) 108 (7.0%) 826 (53.4%) 1,547 
2013 493 (30.0%) 182 (11.1%) 122 (7.4%) 846 (51.5%) 1,643 
2014 541 (30.9%) 202 (11.5%) 133 (7.6%) 876 (50.0%) 1,752 
2015 577 (30.9%) 229 (12.3%) 145 (7.8%) 915 (49.0%) 1,866 
 
 
Panel B: Market capitalization in US$ billion (as percentage of total market capitalization) of 
companies listed on the HKSE by classification 
Year P chips H shares Red chips Rest of HKSE Total  
2005   25   (2.4%) 165 (15.7%) 219 (20.9%)    640 (61.0%) 1,049 
2006   48   (2.8%) 433 (25.3%) 378 (22.1%)    850 (49.7%) 1,710 
2007 185   (7.0%) 651 (24.5%) 708 (26.7%) 1,109 (41.8%) 2,654 
2008   71   (5.4%) 350 (26.5%) 369 (27.9%)    531 (40.2%) 1,320 
2009 238 (10.4%) 604 (26.4%) 496 (21.6%)    953 (41.6%) 2,292 
2010 297 (11.0%) 671 (24.8%) 562 (20.8%) 1,173 (43.4%) 2,702 
2011 209   (9.3%) 526 (23.4%) 513 (22.8%) 1,001 (44.5%) 2,248 
2012 367 (13.0%) 628 (22.3%) 620 (22.0%) 1,199 (42.6%) 2,814 
2013 505 (16.4%) 630 (20.4%) 619 (20.1%) 1,328 (43.1%) 3,082 
2014 527 (16.4%) 735 (22.9%) 670 (20.9%) 1,283 (39.9%) 3,214 
2015 643 (20.3%) 662 (20.9%) 660 (20.9%) 1,199 (37.9%) 3,165 
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TABLE 3 
Sample description 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of key firm characteristics for the P-chip and non-P-chip sub-
samples. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
  Variables Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 
P-chip Total assets (in $mil) 767.1479 1605.8863 101.1657 270.2511 731.8795 
(N=1,564) Net income (in $mil) 46.6408 124.9379 0.2482 13.4604 52.9477 
 
ABSJONES 0.0945 0.0933 0.0313 0.0693 0.1233 
 
SIZE 7.5753 1.4893 6.6046 7.5872 8.5835 
 
MTB 2.3830 3.2813 0.7308 1.4524 2.8790 
 
SALESGROWTH 0.4425 1.2795 -0.0205 0.2302 0.4580 
 
ROA 0.0441 0.2361 0.0024 0.0619 0.1495 
 
OCF 0.0356 0.1259 -0.0239 0.0438 0.1110 
 
LEVERAGE 0.4886 0.8419 0.0247 0.1519 0.5747 
 
EQUITYISSUE 0.2379 0.4259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
DEBTISSUE 0.4348 0.4959 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
OWNERSHIP 0.5124 0.2366 0.3848 0.5585 0.6896 
 
COVERAGE 0.8689 0.9475 0.0000 0.6931 1.3863 
  BIG4 0.6720 0.4696 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Non-P-chip Total assets (in $mil) 1119.5380 5108.3860 72.9769 175.9361 498.9807 
(N=3,237) Net income (in $mil) 61.2200 294.1369 -0.5601 6.9963 28.3079 
 
ABSJONES 0.0791 0.0838 0.0237 0.0545 0.1012 
 
SIZE 7.3499 1.5929 6.3378 7.2178 8.2603 
 
MTB 1.6081 2.6454 0.5084 0.9051 1.7827 
 
SALESGROWTH 0.2511 1.1301 -0.0871 0.0861 0.2576 
 
ROA 0.0181 0.2128 -0.0086 0.0468 0.1064 
 
OCF 0.0380 0.1200 -0.0131 0.0421 0.1049 
 
LEVERAGE 0.6220 1.0259 0.0298 0.2271 0.7105 
 
EQUITYISSUE 0.2091 0.4068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
DEBTISSUE 0.3509 0.4773 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
OWNERSHIP 0.5466 0.2268 0.4355 0.5938 0.7140 
 
COVERAGE 0.5478 0.8238 0.0000 0.0000 0.6931 
  BIG4 0.7164 0.4508 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Panel B: Industry distribution 
This table reports the industry distribution of sample observations based on the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification. Firms classified as Money (SIC=6000-6999) are eliminated from the sample. 
 
Industry P-chip Non P-chip 
Consumer nondurables 257 16.4% 485 15.0% 
Consumer durables 69 4.4% 143 4.4% 
Manufacturing 222 14.2% 364 11.2% 
Energy 85 5.4% 47 1.4% 
Chemicals 67 4.3% 87 2.7% 
Business equipment 256 16.4% 378 11.7% 
Telecommunications 4 0.3% 64 2.0% 
Utilities 30 1.9% 26 0.8% 
Shops 211 13.5% 592 18.3% 
Healthcare 67 4.3% 94 2.9% 
Other 296 18.9% 957 29.6% 
Total 1,564 100.0% 3,237 100.0% 
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TABLE 4  
Evidence on P-chip firms’ aggressive earnings management based on the full sample 
This table reports the results of comparing the level of earnings management between P-chip and non-P-
chip companies listed in Hong Kong from 2005 to 2011. The dependent variable is ABSJONES that 
represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-adjusted Jones 
model (Kothari et al. 2005). PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH is sales growth rate over two 
consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; 
LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and DEBTISSUE are proxies 
for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held shares; COVERAGE is 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is a Big four auditor 
indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression 
coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, 
clustered by firm (Rogers 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
PCHIP 0.0185*** 0.0137*** 0.0105*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
SIZE  -0.0062*** -0.0090*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0015) 
MTB  0.0038*** 0.0033*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) 
SALESGROWTH  0.0101*** 0.0089*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) 
ROA  0.0077 0.0152 
  (0.0120) (0.0119) 
OCF  -0.0784*** -0.0597** 
  (0.0247) (0.0247) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0035** -0.0027* 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) 
EQUITYISSUE   0.0233*** 
   (0.0039) 
DEBTISSUE   0.0120*** 
   (0.0026) 
OWNERSHIP   -0.0096 
   (0.0066) 
COVERAGE   0.0070*** 
   (0.0024) 
BIG4   -0.0046 
   (0.0034) 
Constant 0.0747*** 0.1136*** 0.1289*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0085) (0.0110) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,801 4,801 4,801 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0300 0.0943 0.1114 
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TABLE 5 
Evidence on P-chip firms’ aggressive earnings management based on matched samples 
This table reports the results of comparing the level of earnings management between P-chip and non-P-
chip companies listed in Hong Kong for three matched samples from 2005 to 2011. In column (1), each 
P-chip firm is matched to a non-P-chip firm in the same industry and year. In column (2), SIZE is added 
to the matching criteria. In column (3), an additional criterion of SALESGROWTH is added. The 
dependent variable is ABSJONES that represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated 
using the performance-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). PCHIP represents P-chip companies in 
our sample; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH 
is sales growth rate over two consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow 
scaled by total assets; LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and 
DEBTISSUE are proxies for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held 
shares; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is 
a Big four auditor indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report 
regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in 
parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
PCHIP 0.0115*** 0.0077** 0.0104** 
 (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0041) 
SIZE -0.0084*** -0.0087*** -0.0085*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
MTB 0.0027*** 0.0028*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
SALESGROWTH 0.0072*** 0.0123*** 0.0043 
 (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0038) 
ROA 0.0244 0.0404** -0.0012 
 (0.0156) (0.0170) (0.0212) 
OCF -0.0805*** -0.1066*** -0.0615 
 (0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0379) 
LEVERAGE -0.0027 -0.0035** -0.0028 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0023) 
EQUITYISSUE 0.0169*** 0.0232*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
DEBTISSUE 0.0131*** 0.0117*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0039) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0110 -0.0067 -0.0076 
 (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0097) 
COVERAGE 0.0079*** 0.0070** 0.0061* 
 (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
BIG4 -0.0042 -0.0029 -0.0001 
 (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0045) 
Constant 0.1266*** 0.1309*** 0.1306*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0156) (0.0167) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,040 2,528 2,042 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0994 0.1202 0.0819 
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TABLE 6 
Other evidence of P-chip firms’ aggressive financial dealings 
This table reports the results of comparing P-chip and non-P-chip companies listed in Hong Kong from 
2005 to 2011 using other measures of corporate malfeasance. MBE is an indicator variable that equals one 
if a firm meets or just beats analysts’ consensus forecast by one cent, and zero otherwise. HIGHFSCORE 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the probability of material misstatement estimated using the F-
score model (Dechow et al. 2011) is above normal risk, and zero otherwise. TUNNELING is proxied by 
other receivables scaled by total assets. PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our sample; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio; SALESGROWTH is sales growth rate over 
two consecutive years; ROA is return on assets; OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets; 
LEVERAGE is total debt divided by market value of equity; EQUITYISSUE and DEBTISSUE are proxies 
for equity and debt issuance respectively; OWNERSHIP represents closely-held shares; COVERAGE is 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm; BIG4 is a Big four auditor 
indicator. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression 
coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, 
clustered by firm (Rogers 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 MBE HIGHFSCORE TUNNELING 
    
PCHIP 0.4137** 0.3758*** 0.0116** 
 (0.1656) (0.1335) (0.0045) 
SIZE -0.1424 0.1299* -0.0002 
 (0.0882) (0.0670) (0.0019) 
MTB 0.0590* 0.0289 0.0015** 
 (0.0348) (0.0183) (0.0006) 
SALESGROWTH -0.1403 0.1637*** 0.0068*** 
 (0.0963) (0.0337) (0.0017) 
ROA 0.2499 0.4212 0.0064 
 (0.5030) (0.2818) (0.0103) 
OCF 0.5994 -3.5397*** -0.0389*** 
 (0.7526) (0.5425) (0.0131) 
LEVERAGE -0.4397** -0.1610* 0.0029* 
 (0.1845) (0.0862) (0.0017) 
EQUITYISSUE -0.0645 1.7666*** 0.0077** 
 (0.2006) (0.1317) (0.0036) 
DEBTISSUE 0.1050 -0.0977 0.0116*** 
 (0.1291) (0.1167) (0.0031) 
OWNERSHIP 0.4794 -0.7286*** -0.0010 
 (0.3199) (0.2595) (0.0083) 
COVERAGE 0.2186* 0.0899 -0.0015 
 (0.1298) (0.1003) (0.0028) 
BIG4 -0.2680 -0.2936* -0.0085* 
 (0.2181) (0.1500) (0.0050) 
Constant -1.2520** -4.5913*** 0.0277** 
 (0.5574) (0.5134) (0.0126) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,094 4,876 4,876 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.0674 0.1985 0.0544 
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TABLE 7 
Enforcement difficulty as an explanation for P-chip companies’ aggressive earnings management 
This table reports the results of comparing the level of earnings management among P-chip companies for 
a sample period from 2005 to 2011, conditional on their legal and economic development. The 
benchmark group is non-P-chip firms. The dependent variable is ABSJONES that represents the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 
2005). MARKETIZATION is the level of legal and economic development of the Chinese province in 
which a P-chip firm is headquartered; HIGH_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for 
cities/provinces that have the lowest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among P-chip observations, 
and zero otherwise; MEDIUM_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that 
have an NERI index value between the 25th and 75th percentile among P-chip observations, and zero 
otherwise; LOW_MARKETIZATION is an indicator that equals one for cities/provinces that have the 
highest 25th percentile of the NERI index value among P-chip observations, and zero otherwise; PCHIP 
represents P-chip companies in our sample. Control variables are the same as those included in Table 4. 
More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed 
by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 
1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
MARKETIZATION -0.0059***  
 (0.0019)  
LOW_MARKETIZATION×PCHIP  0.0232*** 
  (0.0072) 
MED_MARKETIZATION×PCHIP  0.0091* 
  (0.0048) 
HIGH_MARKETIZATION×PCHIP  0.0089** 
  (0.0044) 
Constant 0.1886*** 0.1292*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0111) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4,790 4,790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1104 0.1113 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
TABLE 8 
Market analysis  
This table compares the market reaction to earnings announcements between P-chip and non-P-chip firms 
for a sample period from 2005 to 2011. CAR(0, +1) is the cumulative abnormal returns over the (0,+1) 
window around the earnings announcement date; CAR(-1, +5) is the cumulative abnormal returns over 
the (-1,+5) window around the earnings announcement date; PCHIP represents P-chip companies in our 
sample; SUE represents the deciles of earnings surprise measured as the change in earnings scaled by total 
assets; LOSS is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a loss, and zero otherwise; SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio. More detailed variable definitions are 
outlined in Appendix B. We report regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses, clustered by firm (Roger 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
 
 
 CAR (0, +1) CAR (-1, +5) 
   
PCHIP 0.0107** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0083) 
SUE 0.0067*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0030) 
SUE×PCHIP -0.0021** -0.0029** 
 (0.0008) (0.0013) 
LOSS 0.0119** 0.0174** 
 (0.0056) (0.0085) 
MTB -0.0003 -0.0005 
 (0.0007) (0.0011) 
SIZE -0.0001 0.0015 
 (0.0015) (0.0023) 
SUE×LOSS -0.0048*** -0.0062*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) 
SUE×MTB -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) 
SUE×SIZE -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Constant -0.0456*** -0.0719*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0187) 
Observations 4,709 4,709 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0444 0.0362 
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TABLE 9 
Alternative cross-listing settings 
This table compares the level of earnings management between AH firms and non-AH firms for a sample 
of H-share firms in column (1), and between US-listed Chinese private sector firms and domestic US 
firms in column (2). In both cases the sample period is from 2005 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
ABSJONES that represents the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-
adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). AH is an indicator for H-share firms also listed in China; 
USPCHIP is an indicator for private sector Chinese firms listed in the US. Control variables are the same 
as those included in Table 4. More detailed variable definitions are outlined in Appendix B. We report 
regression coefficients followed by heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) in 
parentheses, clustered by firm (Rogers 1993). *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
AH -0.0091*  
 (0.0048)  
USPCHIP  0.0294** 
  (0.0120) 
Constant 0.0314 0.1529*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0094) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 627 14,546 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1380 0.1971 
 
 
